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Abstract: The first chapter investigates the health and social impacts of a new pen-
sion system in China. China initiated the new rural pension scheme targeting the large
rural population in 2009. This new scheme was claimed to be a huge improvement
to the previous welfare institution and a strong defense to rural people’s elderly life.
Using panel data from the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS),
I apply the PSM-DID approach to identify causal relationships between the pension
and multiple covariates at the individual level. I have found that the pension sig-
nificantly reduced systolic and diastolic pressures, as well as improved overall health
and life quality of participants. I acknowledge the positive influences of China’s new
rural pension on elderly life of the rural population, and discuss potential directions
for future research.
The second chapter explores the impacts of co-residing grandparents on children from
a Chinese perspective. The matrilateral bias hypothesis (MBH) implies that children
may expect more supports from their maternal grandparents. Nevertheless, the cur-
rent literature has not shed much light on how different genders are affected by grand-
parental lineage under the multi-generational coresidence context. In this chapter, I
document and discuss lineage heterogeneity of grandparental impacts on grandchil-
dren, and as well explore whether girls benefit more from the maternal grandparents
than boys do. To resolve endogeneity bias where the standard IV approach is infeasi-
ble, I fit panel data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) into a fixed effects
model and then apply the heteroskedasticity-based instruments of Lewbel (2012) as
a robustness check. The results suggest that compared to direct interaction with co-
residing grandparents, grandchildren are more likely to be influenced through parents.
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CHAPTER I
HOW DID CHINA’S NEW RURAL PENSION SCHEME AFFECT
THE AGED RURAL POPULATION? AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
WITH THE CLHLS DATA
1.1 Introduction
As aging rapidly, China is moving fast on expanding the old-age pension system to
catch up with the aging speed. For the past decades, China has achieved remarkable
improvements in the coverage expansion of the old-age pension. However, before 2009
the focus was primarily on urban areas. Then as formally announced in the October
of 2009, the Chinese government launched a new pension program aiming to provide
basic life supports to the elderly living in rural areas.
China has the largest elderly population in the world. According to the most
recent statistical yearbook, the elderly population took 11.4% of the total population
in China, more than half of which were living in rural areas holding a rural Hukou
(a system of household registration, used to regulate migration across regions). In
2017, the old-age dependency ratio in rural China was 19.62% and 3.94% higher
than in urban regions. On the other hand, the poverty rate in rural China was
comparatively high as well. In 2010, the poverty rate among the old people living
in rural communities was as high as 22.3%, compared to 4.6% among the urban old
people and 3.4% among the general urban residents (Vilela, 2013). Accompanied by
the economic inequality were discrepancies in health status. Cao et al. (2019) disclosed
significant inequalities in diabetes caused by unequal socioeconomic statuses in China.
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He et al. (2019) showed that the prevalence of frailty (both a risk measure of adverse
health outcomes and/or mortality as well as a necessity measure of health-care) in the
older Chinese in rural areas was 5.1% higher than in urban areas. Besides physical
healthiness, Hu et al. (2019) revealed a discrepancy in mental healthiness between
the elderly living in rural and urban locations in China.
To improve the well-being of the old-age people living in rural areas, the Chinese
government initiated a new pension scheme in 2009. This new pension system was
named China’s New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) and launched in 314 pilot coun-
ties of 30 provinces on October 1, 2009. One year later, it was officially signed into a
policy and being promoted nationwide. By the end of 2012, over 90% of the counties
in China had been covered. The most significant difference between the old and new
pension schemes lies in the contribution mechanism. The old pension system almost
completely relies on personal savings, while the new one utilizes a combination of per-
sonal savings, community contributions and government subsidies. This mechanism
lessens the burden to participate. Once a participant has reached age 60, she starts
to receive monthly pension income.1
A natural question would be how this new pension system benefited beneficia-
ries’ lifestyles and well-being. Despite a large amount of literature on related topics,
most of which only used data before 2012. There are two drawbacks of solely taking
observations before 2012 into consideration. Firstly, the NRPS was implemented in
not so many counties before 2012; the relatively small sample size tended to generate
measurement errors and lacked external validity. Secondly, such a time-span choice
resulted in the fact that we could only observe short-term effects. Therefore, a large
fraction of the previous literature merely shed light on the instantaneous outcomes
such as labor supply, intergenerational co-residence habit and financial dependency
on adult children. Chen et al. (2018) and Cheng et al. (2018b) both showed that the
1This monthly pension income is a fixed amount within each administrative region yet may differ
across regions. The minimum amount was 55 RMB (about 8 USD) in 2009.
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NRPS affected the co-residence habit which was popular among the elderly in rural
China and encouraged them to live independently. You and Niño-Zarazúa (2019)
found that the pension income benefited wealthier families; moreover, the intergen-
erational transfer behavior found in their study was consistent with the research of
Duflo (2003). Li and Wu (2018b) demonstrated an increase of the political trust in
government which was brought by the NRPS implementation.
Short-term data could lead to some contradictory conclusions. Consequently, there
has been an argument regarding effects of the NRPS on the enrollees’ labor supply.
Xie (2015), Zhao et al. (2016) and Ning et al. (2016) claimed that the NRPS did not
have any significant impacts on altering labor supply. On the contrary, Chen et al.
(2015), Huang and Zhang (2016) and Li et al. (2018) provided evidence that the NRPS
decreased labor supply of the elderly in rural areas. Several papers tried to resolve this
disagreement. Lin et al. (2018) proposed an explanation to the conflict by dividing
labor supply into formal and informal labor supply. Lin (2018) applied heterogeneity
in gender to reconcile the contradictory findings in the literature. This kind of liter-
ature discrepancy also appeared on health effects of the NRPS. Xie (2015) presented
a close-to-zero impact of the NRPS on the participants’ mental health in compari-
son with Zhang et al. (2019), who identified an improvement in the mental health
of the elderly caused by the NRPS. Although different identification and estimation
strategies could be a reason of the conflicting results, it was also highly possible that
the opposite observations were due to lack of data, non-persistent short-term effects
and/or heterogeneity in geographic location. Thus, our goal was to explore the effects
of the NRPS on healthiness-related variables using a nationwide scope.
This paper was aiming to investigate the effects of the NRPS on multiple outcomes.
Our primary interest was to check how the NRPS program affected the health and
well-being of enrollees. We used the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey
(CLHLS) from 2005 to 2014 as our empirical data to work on (Zeng et al., 2017).
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This dataset is nationwide and contains health outcomes after the expansion of the
NRPS program, which could help resolve the issue of lacking external validity. Tak-
ing advantage of the most recent wave of survey, we observed the health outcomes
of participants after at most five years of the pension initiation. Besides, we also
observed people’s participation decisions in two waves of the sample and could dis-
tinguish people who initially enrolled in the program at different times or quit at
different times. This underlying time gap gave us a chance to investigate how the
effects of the NRPS evolved over time. We exposed that the NRPS had significant
and robust effects on decreasing both the systolic and diastolic pressures, which had
been evolving differently for the two measures of blood pressure, and improving life
qualities. The latter result was consistent with the study of Liu et al. (2015), where
the authors showed that the NRPS improved the life quality measured by a quality
scale of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Guangdong, China. We also found
a significantly negative correlation between the NRPS enrollment and the financial
dependency on grandchildren in long term. On the other hand, we showed that de-
spite the enrollment in each round had positive influences on health (both self- and
interviewer-evaluated), which turned out to be hardly prominent after being disen-
tangled and reexamined with respect to each particular round of survey. This finding
gave us a clue about the adverse selection problem in a dynamic process of enrollment
in the NRPS.
Challenges in estimating the effects of the NRPS lied in two aspects: potential
self-selection and existence of other health-relevant policies. To deal with these two
problems, we adopted the PSM-DID method to conduct a difference-in-difference
regression following a matching based on the propensity scores. The PSM and DID
procedures jointly took care of the endogeneity concern. Other than that, the unique
feature that our data exclusively contain individuals older than 60 years helped with
getting rid of the first challenge, as participants aged 60 and above automatically
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qualified for the minimum pension at the time of implementation without paying any
premiums.
People might also have concerns on possible disturbances from the co-existing
policies. One major concern was the effects of the New Rural Cooperative Medical
Insurance (NRCMS). The NRCMS was first introduced in 2002 and then significantly
enhanced in the health-care reform in 2009, namely the year when the NRPS was
launched. The contribution mechanism of the NRCMS is similar to the one of the
NRPS, and as well has been designed to lessen financial burdens of obtaining better
health-care for people living in rural regions. By covering parts of the medical costs,
the NRCMS had substantially improved the health-care access and utilization among
the participants (You and Kobayashi, 2009; Babiarz et al., 2010). Although the
designs and goals are comparatively alike between the NRPS and NRCMS, we believe
that our results would not be affected by the very existence of the NRCMS. Firstly,
several research projects showed that the NRCMS did not significantly reduce the
out-of-pocket payments from participants (Wagstaff et al., 2007; You and Kobayashi,
2009; Sun et al., 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009). Therefore, the extra pension income from
the NRPS, which is essentially a positive income shock, could still be considered
to have strong enough impacts on one’s health. Secondly, using the difference-in-
difference method with fixed effects controlled at the individual level, we filtered out
the irrelevant factors in time trends including the effects of the other policies.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the impacts of the NRPS on
the well-being in old age in rural China, especially to the few works of literature ex-
ploring the health effects of the NRPS. Previously, most papers paid major attention
to mental health, as in Xie (2015) and Zhang et al. (2019). The others focused on
the effects of a general pension program. Ding et al. (2018) showed the overall pos-
itive impacts of micro-finance programs managed by government on people’s health
outcomes; while Huang and Zhang (2016) described the positive effects of pension
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insurance on health in terms of disability, weight and height in multiple countries.
Among the literature which mainly discussed the effects of the NRPS, Zhang et al.
(2018) found improvements in chronic diseases induced by the NRPS through reduc-
ing food poverty. The most similar paper to ours is the study of Cheng et al. (2018a),
where the authors pinned down the positive effects of the NRPS on multiple health
and well-being measures including life quality using a panel-IV approach on two waves
of the CLHLS. We expanded the time horizon of analysis and selected four waves of
the CLHLS. In this way, we could check how the effects eventually evolved. Besides,
we provided a new perspective with a different identification strategy. Our overall
results are highly consistent with the Cheng et al. (2018a) paper, which supplies
evidence to the robustness of our results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second section introduces the
data and variables we chose in details; the third section explains our fundamental
identification method; the fourth section reports our findings and robustness tests;
and finally the last section concludes the paper and discusses potential limitations.
1.2 Data and Variables
1.2.1 Data Source
This study used data from the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS).
The CLHLS is a survey aiming to collect a representative sample of the elderly Chi-
nese in a nationwide range. The researchers fielded the baseline wave in 1998 and
six waves thereafter. The baseline survey sampled 8,959 individuals, who were fol-
lowed up every two to three years. At each wave, survivors from the last wave were
re-interviewed, yet deceased interviewees were replaced with new participants. The
survey waves were fielded face to face, and each wave took about a year to finish.
The seven waves were conducted in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008-2009, 2011-2012 and
2014, respectively.
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There are several advantages to use the CLHLS data. First, it is a nationwide
dataset, through which we could explore the effects of the NRPS on health outcomes
in a national domain and avoid the problems of lacking external validity. Second, this
dataset places a greater weight on the elderly in the sample-selection process, espe-
cially on people aged above one hundred. According to Koenig (2001), until 2001, the
CLHLS included the largest sample of centenarians in the world. Thirdly, utilizing
consistent survey questionnaires, this dataset covers several years both before and af-
ter the implementation of the NRPS. Therefore, we ended up with direct observations
on changes in health and welfare outcomes for the participants.
We employed four waves from the survey dataset in our research. These four waves
document a set of various demographic variables from the year 2005 (four years before
the pilot launch of the NRPS) to the year 2014 (five years after the experimental
implementation and two years after the national coverage of the NRPS). Information
of the participants after the official announcement on the NRPS are contained in the
last two waves (2011-2012, 2014).
1.2.2 Enrollment in the NRPS
To participate in the NRPS, each individual needed to register in person to set up
a personal account. This participation information was collected in our sample since
the third wave. Since the policy was first introduced to some pilot regions by the
end of the second wave of survey, which was basically done at that time, the sample
failed to capture observations on the participants until the third wave began. Thus,
our records on participation decisions were derived from the last two waves of survey
distributed at the end of the year 2011 and 2014, respectively. In this paper, we
processed these two post-policy waves as two rounds of registration following the
nationwide promotion of the new pension policy, which was in 2010, right before the
first round (2011-2012) of registration.
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From figure 1, we could see that the NRPS covered all the 23 provinces included
in the CLHLS sample. The participation rates in most provinces were above 15%.
There were few provinces with a large population that achieved a more than 40%
participation rate in the NRPS. The participation rate of the second post-policy
round (four years after the expansion of the NRPS) significantly increased in almost
every province or municipality except for Beijing, Shanghai, Heilongjiang and Hainan.
The second panel in figure 1 visualized the proportions of participants from different
provinces, where we observed that those provinces with a larger population relying
heavily on the agricultural economy (e.g., the Shandong province) usually took a more
substantial proportion in the participation sample. The demographic distributions of
the round 1 and 2 registrations were similar. From figure 2, the gender ratios among
the NRPS participants in both rounds were balanced and comparable to the overall
gender ratio of the elderly in China. Moreover, most participants were living in rural
and town areas.2
Figure 3 and 4 gave us a taste of the likely motivations of participating in the
NRPS. In figure 3, most participants did not enroll with other pension programs and
were in good health conditions. This result seemed to be contradictory to the adverse
selection theory. However, considering that many of the participants also enrolled
in the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS), we could infer that those
who were willing to enroll in an extra pension program cared more about healthiness.
In addition, since we did not observe the exact time point of participation, there
might be a simultaneous two-way relationship between the NRPS enrollment and
the self-reported health. Therefore, this distribution was unable to imply any causal
relationships between health and willingness to participate. From figure 4, most
participants were self-employed and did not have a stable post-retirement income
source. The underlying situation was that the primary source of financial support
2The neighborhood classifications were defined using the current living location instead of the
Hukou (a household registration system) location.
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to the elderly, or at least the elderly in rural regions, was still their adult children.
Before the participants retired, most of their income was from agricultural activities,
which confirmed our knowledge that the NRPS was designed for and easily accessible
to people with a rural Hukou.
The similar distributions of demographic characteristics in round 1 and 2 made
it more solid to compare the influences of the NRPS on the first- and second-round
participants. The difference in participation timings gave us an excellent resource
to explore how the effects of this pension scheme on health and well-being outcomes
evolved. For those who enrolled before or in round 1 (the first post-policy round), we
tracked their health outcomes for two to three years after the enrollment; yet for those
who participated in round 2 (the second post-policy round), we could only test for
short-term effects, which we expected to be at most significant on some instantaneous
outcomes.
1.2.3 Measures of Health and Well-being of the Elderly
To quantify the interviewees’ healthiness, we utilized six variables: heart rate, sys-
tolic pressure, diastolic pressure, self-rated health, self-reported sleep quality, and
interviewer-rated health status. The first three measures are objective and have
strong correlations with the common chronic diseases, which were more likely to be
affected by income (Zhang et al., 2018). These data are easy to collect for interviewers
with portable medical equipments and are essential indicators of the health risks faced
by the elderly. Heart rate is an index for risk towards cardiovascular diseases; while
systolic and diastolic pressures are both used in hypertension diagnosis. According to
the most recent aging and health report published by the World Health Organization
(World Health Organization, 2015), in 2015 the prevalence of hypertension among
people aged 60 and over was 66.9% in China and the self-reported annual rate of
myocardial infarction among the elderly was 1.3%, which both belonged to the most
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common diseases affecting mortality risk and life quality of the elderly.
The self-reported health and sleep quality are subjective measures of health. Due
to the nature of self assessment, these two values reflected not only the health condi-
tion but also the level of satisfaction on the current status of each survey participant.
The other health measure we chose was the health status reported by the interviewer.
This variable reflected an impression of outsiders on the participants’ health and could
be seen as an adjustment to the self-assessed values.
Besides the indexes for health, we incorporated some other covariates to explore
how the well-being and financial independence of the elderly responded to the imple-
mentation of the NRPS. We used self-rated life quality as a measure of the well-being.
For the financial independence, we took net transfers from children and grandchil-
dren, decision power in the household, and preference towards independent living as
proxies. These variables were included to evaluate how the NRPS affected the par-
ticipants’ overall level of satisfaction on life, living arrangement preference as well as
intergenerational financial interactions.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 The Basic Model
The basic regression model is :
yit = τ · treatmentit + λ · policy_yeart
+ δdid · treatmentit · policy_yeart +X ′itβ + αi + γt + µit
(1.1)
In the equation, yit indicates outcome variables, namely the variables on which
we wanted to explore the effects of the new pension scheme. We employed twelve
variables in this study, which covered multiple aspects of the elderly life that had not
been addressed sufficiently in the current literature. The variables may be categorized
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into four types.
• Physical measures of the elderly including heart rate, systolic and diastolic
pressures provide a basic and dynamic overview of the health conditions.
• Intergenerational transfers including net annual transfers from children and
grandchildren document the cross-generational supports received.
• Subjective evaluations including self-rated health, interviewer-rated health, life
quality and sleep quality are a set of five-level numerical scales that quantita-
tively reflect respondent’s or interviewer’s views on the current situation.
• Self-management abilities including decision-making power over household spend-
ing and personal matters as well as preference for independent living are ordinals
that indicate the level of confidence in fulfilling daily tasks.
The variable treatmentit marks the treated from the untreated. The variable
policy_yeart equals 0 for rounds before the policy, and 1 after the policy. The product
of treatmentit and policy_yeart, namely the DID estimate, is what we were interested
in. X ′it is a vector of individual controls.3 To accommodate the panel structure, we
also introduced the individual fixed effects αi and the round dummies γt. The error
term is denoted by µit.
1.3.2 Exogeneity of the Treatment and Determinants of the Participation
A unique feature of our data might add extra credibility to the identification of infer-
ence. The panel only contained people aged 60 and above. Per the pension schedule,
uninsured people who had reached 60 at the time of implementation automatically
qualified for the minimum pension without paying any premiums (they might still
3Including: gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, community location, province, education, pre-
retirement career, average household income, household size, times being seriously ill, alternative
pension participation, number of children, major financial source, type of staple food, quantity of
staple food consumed per day, and the BMI index.
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choose to pay if they wished to receive higher compensations).4 This design made
the pension a quasi-exogenous intervention to the sample.
Nevertheless, we were still concerned by rationality of the exogeneity claim as
whether the acceptance was driven by any covariates was the key in this case. We
thus regressed the choice of enrollment on a series of controls we believed to be
influential over the decision using the entire sample. These controls were the same
as what we used in the main model. Besides that, we developed different modules to
test some of the outcome variables that seemingly correlated with the decision one at
a time and at last all together.5
Table 1 reported the regression results of the selected potential determinants for
each module. The estimates on the outcome variables were relatively small and listed
at the bottom of the table. All the modules incorporated the individual fixed effects
and had variances clustered at the individual level. We could see that the estimates
were very consistent across modules, so the outcome variables hardly interfered with
the decision-making. The positive effect of age suggested that the probability of
participation increased as age increased. People had stronger interests in the pension
as getting older.
We employed a variable indicating the major financial sources of respondents. All
the clearly stated alternatives implied a smaller likelihood of participation compared
to the base group: retirement wage. Enrollment in other available pensions signifi-
cantly lessened the probability of joining the new scheme. Choosing a mix of rice and
wheat over-consuming rice only could be a sign of less income and hence raised the
participation probability. A larger quantity of staple food consumed per day usually
was related to more disposable income, which would ease the eagerness for receiving
transfer payments. Overall, the above findings confirmed our knowledge that the
4They merely needed to set up a pension account at their Hukou locations and would begin to
receive payments since the second month.
5The outcome variables are “making decisions of family spending”, “net transfers from children”,
and “net transfers from grandchildren”.
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target crowds were uninsured and without constant external supports. Surprisingly,
the impacts of household income were very small and could be neglected.
The outcome variables showed significant correlations with the decision. Since
each single round of the survey was a post-decision cross-section of the timeline, we
could not make any strong causal inference here. However, there were still some in-
teresting facts revealed. Compared to having no idea of how often oneself determined
family spending (likely caused by cognitive incapability), the interviewee’s tendency
to participate became clearer as her power over spending decisions became stronger.
Net transfers from children were positively correlated with the decision, yet those from
grandchildren were negatively correlated. Given that financial support from children
is still the major form of old-age support, additional transfers from grandchildren
might be considered as a type of double insurance.
Although we could not completely rule out endogeneity of the decision, our iden-
tification still holds. Moreover, the questionable covariates and the individual fixed
effects were accounted for in our model at the first place.
1.3.3 Identification: PSM-DID
In this study, we applied the difference-in-difference regression following a propensity
score matching (PSM-DID) to achieve identification. The rationale of this approach
is that it satisfies the presumption of DID through pairing treated and untreated
individuals who are similar in major characteristics. Without the intervention, the
matched individuals would have developed along parallel paths. Therefore, any addi-
tional divergence in outcome variables has to be caused by the only difference between
the treatment and control groups, the pension in this case.
To ensure a convincing identification, we were careful with the time window selec-
tion. On one hand, we wanted to allow enough time for the pensions to take effects
on the enrollees. It usually takes time for some health measures and behavioral pat-
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terns to evolve. On the other hand, we would like to track the enrollees back to an
early pre-policy year to exclude any potential disturbances in the matching process.
Even the policy has not been officially implemented, informal information or personal
forecasts could alter people’s actions. However, given the gap of two to three calendar
years between every two rounds of the CLHLS surveys, it is difficult for a fixed sample
of the aged population to survive through too many rounds. A time span covering
two rounds before and after the policy respectively is a reasonable choice.
First we filtered out respondents who presented in all the four rounds of surveys.
With the major cause of exit in the middle being decease, the sample shrank by about
four-fifths yet stilled formed a strictly balanced and considerably representative panel.
Then we tagged the early enrollees from the third round, namely the first round after
the policy was announced, and matched them to non-participants in the first round
based on propensity scores calculated from a set of covariates that we were going to
use in our basic analysis. Finally, we dropped the off-support individuals and non-
participants not paired with any participants and obtained a sample that contains
treated and untreated individuals highly resembling each other except for the pension
enrollment.
Figure 5 exhibited the matching results. The standardized percentages of bias
across covariates for the matched sample basically located inside the ±5% band.
Within the matched sample, differences by covariate were all greatly insignificant.
Judging as well from the bar graph of the propensity scores, we considered the match-
ing balanced and successful.
We conducted a t-test on pre-policy sample means of the outcome variables for
the treatment and control groups before the matching. Table 2 presented the results.
We could see that there were significant inter-group differences for self-rated health,
sleep quality, deciding family spending and personal matters. If the matching were
effective, some differences should be removed afterward.
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Table 3 presented the sample composition after matching. We ended up with four
rounds of observations on 1,380 individuals. There were 788 females and 592 males.
Starting from the third round, enrollees of the new pension showed up in the panel.
Female enrollees were more than male enrollees. The total number of enrollment
increased by 89 from the third round to the fourth one. Based on the third-round
participation, we separated treatment and control groups for all the four waves.
Before running the regression, we once again did simple t-tests of the dependent
variables over the two groups. Using the policy as a time cutoff, this time we reported
t-test statistics of sample means before and after the cutoff in table 4. In the pre-
policy test, most mean differences were insignificant. Compared to the test before
our matching, except for influence on family spending, the rest of the discrepancies
were successfully removed. The results served as a side proof to the effectiveness of
matching, since both the treated and untreated exhibited remarkable similarity in the
outcome variables as well (in addition to the controlled covariates). The post-policy
test marked systolic pressure, diastolic pressure, health rated by the interviewer,
health rated by self, and life quality as significantly different at the 5% level and
above. An average non-participant had higher systolic and diastolic pressures, lower
ratings of health and life quality than a participant. Given these differences following
the announcement of the new rural pension, we were showing to what extent the
changes may be accredited to enrollment in the pension scheme in the section below.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 General DID
Table 5 and 6 reported the results from our DID model. As predicted in the previ-
ous t-tests, the pension reduced both systolic and diastolic pressures of participants
within the normal range and hence improved their health conditions. The systolic
decreased by 2.7 and the diastolic by roughly 2.4. Systolic and diastolic pressures
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are indicators for potential hypertension diseases. They measure how much force
the heart needs to pump blood through one’s arteries when it contracts. Even when
these two indicators locate in a normal range, lowering them helps reduce the risk
of hypertension. Recently researchers also confirmed the relationship between mor-
tality rate and the systolic/diastolic pressure. Taylor et al. (2011) and Sherazi and
Zaręba (2011) both showed that one could use the systolic and diastolic pressures as
predictors for mortality.
The self-appraisal of life quality was raised by a little more than 0.16. The
interviewer-rated health was as well raised by about 0.1. The estimates aligned with
each other and together revealed the positive impacts of this new pension. China’s
rural population has long been a group of low earnings. The pension increased old
people’s disposable income, and consequently led to a more balanced and healthy meal
plan. Based on our findings, we concluded that the new pension scheme effectively
improved the health conditions and daily life of the participating elderly.
Previous experience taught us that policy impacts are usually difficult to identify
within the beginning of several years. Therefore, for the impacts to fully emerge, we
used the third-round enrollment status as the principal indicator. Nevertheless, an
accompanying concern was that the enrollment status was not invariant through the
entire time span. Some enrollees dropped out of the program in the fourth round,
yet some non-enrollees joined. This particular issue did not necessarily undermine
our results. As we discussed, changes in behavioral patterns do not happen as soon
as income rises. Participants might wait for a few months or even longer before
withdrawing from the pension account. In order to understand the mechanism more
comprehensively, we were going to explore heterogeneity in pension impacts by the
length of participation in the following section.
Besides policy effects, we also observed some other correlations or causations.
Rural residents seemed to favor living independently more the elsewhere residents
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did. An increase by one Liang (50 grams) in daily consumption of staple food slightly
improved sleep quality, interviewer-rated and self-rated health by less than 0.02. The
frequency of serious illness in the past year brought down all the subjective well-being
measures just as expected.
1.4.2 DID with Respect to the Length of Enrollment
We created a variable to document the length of enrollment for each individual. It
arranged individuals into three categories: new enrollees in the fourth round, enrollees
who left before the fourth round, and all-time enrollees. Then we interacted each
category with policy_yeart to capture the length-specific effects in the model. Table
7 and 8 exhibited what we obtained.
The decrease in systolic pressure grew to 3.55 for the all-time enrollees, yet lost
significance for those who only enrolled in one period. Diastolic pressure decreased by
about the same size as before for the third-round participants who then quit, while
surprisingly increased by 2.07 for the new members in the fourth round. According
to Taylor et al. (2011), for people older than 50 years, the systolic pressure is a
more precise predictor for hypertension, compared to the diastolic pressure. Thus we
believe in the long term, the NRPS still would have significantly positive effects on
cardiovascular health. Preference for living independently rose by 0.13 for the last-
round participants. The all-time enrollees received a 0.19 higher rating of life quality
on average, while no particular effects were spotted for the new enrollees who entered
in the fourth round.
The third-round participants were rated 0.11 healthier by interviewers. All the
single-period enrollees experienced a decrease ranging from 0.21 to 0.27 in decision-
making power over family spending following enrollment in the pension. Loss of influ-
ence in expenditure decisions might be more apparent for old people whose pension
account was set up and managed by someone on behalf, yet faded out in regression on
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the whole sample. Net transfers from grandchildren to the all-time enrollees dropped
by 350 Yuan. It could be that the elderly refused some supports from their grandchil-
dren, or the grandchildren cut the transfers after observed a reliable and consistent
support to their grandparents.
Despite the heterogeneity in the pension impacts, the results overall supported
our findings in the general DID module. Here we propose a hypothetical explanation
for the diastolic pressure increase of the new enrollees in the fourth round. In the long
run, we believe that a permanent income raise will improve nutrition balance, while
in the short run, especially within one year following the raise, increased consumption
of certain food may lead to high salt intake and push up average diastolic pressure.
1.4.3 Robustness Check of the DID Results
The validity of DID relies on several assumptions that need to be tested. In this
section we report the test outcomes. To summarize in advance, our sample had
a satisfying performance in all the examinations and offered more ground to the
identification strategy.
Table 9 tabulated the results of the parallel trends test without controls. Among
all the dependent variables, merely heart rate and net transfers from children failed
the test, suggesting the very existence of pre-policy discrepancies between the two
groups.
Table 10 displayed the test results of the parallel trends assumption with the full
set of controls. This time net transfers from children as well as interviewer-evaluated
health to a mild extent refuted the assumption. The significant estimates in the
general DID module, namely systolic pressure, diastolic pressure and life quality,
once again successfully passed the test, and hence provided persuasive proof to the
identification.
We wanted to make sure that our setup of the groups based on the third-round
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enrollment status was plausible, so we verified and reported the results in table 11. If
the segmentation was solid, the pension impacts should solely manifest to the treat-
ment group, and the control group could not be affected at all. To do the test, we
randomly selected 300 individuals from the control group and assigned them to the
new treatment group, and the rest were sent to the new control group. We then used
the same model to estimate “counter-factual” DID effects. Just like expected, except
for an increase of 2.56 in diastolic pressure which was significant at the 5% level, no
other significant estimates presented. Since we found that the pension reduced dias-
tolic pressure for the participants, a rise of diastolic pressure to the non-participants
could be seen as a double verification of our findings on the pension impacts.
Moreover, we developed table 12 to show the influence dynamics of the pension
scheme by separating the average effects into round-specific effects. For participants,
diastolic pressure decreased in the third round by about 2, and then decreased even
more in the fourth (by 2.9). Given that, the impacts of pension on diastolic pressure
probably were the most apparent and credible. The reduction in systolic pressure
was insignificant at first, and then became significant and larger (-3.76) in the fourth
round. Quality of life increased approximately by 0.21 in the third round only. The
improvement of interviewer-appraised health was about 0.11 in the third round, yet
turned insignificant in the following round. Solely for the third round, self-evaluated
health rose by approximately 0.16, while net transfers from grandchildren dropped
by 220 Yuan. In summary, table 12 offered a perspective on the paths along which
the pension took effect.
1.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this study we applied the PSM-DID approach on a CLHLS panel to explore the
impacts of China’s New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS). Our design achieved a valid
and clean identification and successfully exposed a few causal relationships. We found
19
that the pension effectively lowered the participants’ systolic and diastolic pressures,
as well as improved their overall health status and life quality. Moreover, participation
of the pension discouraged net transfers from grandchildren. In conclusion, the new
pension scheme played a critical role in providing basic supports to the uninsured old
people from rural China.
There were some limitations in our research, which could become contributions
of future studies on the NRPS. Firstly, due to incompleteness and inconsistency of
the records on monthly payment and compensation in our sample, we were unable
to account for these variations in the model. Without any doubt, controlling for the
premium payment (if any) and the actual amount received would give us extra insight
into the topic. Depending on the availability of such data, future studies may find
rationales of the current fee schedule and compensation standard, estimate income
elasticities of old people’s life characteristics, or scrutinize patterns in intra-household
allocations and intergenerational transfers.
Secondly, many outcome variables employed in this study were arbitrary numbers
given be either interviewers or interviewees. Such measures likely contained both
useful information and biases from human judgment, as they were estimations based
on personal recognition instead of objective observation after all. Most of the time
the sign of estimate on such a variable carries more practical significance than the
actual magnitude. When we see an estimate of 2.175 on impacts on happiness, we
will easily interpret that the people have become happier, but we can hardly imagine
what “2.175 happier” means. Therefore, quantities like heart rate that can be directly
measured yet imply the conditions of interviewees minimize survey biases, and should
have priority over personal ratings in variable selection if available.
Thirdly, we made a hypothetical explanation pending verification for the changes
in systolic and diastolic pressures. If researchers have the chance to incorporate
detailed daily food consumption or nutrition intake, which we do not have, into the
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study, they will gain a more comprehensive understanding of the influence channels
of the pension.
Lastly, our latest data were from five years ago and could not reflect the most
recent adjustments in the policy. We are eager to see analyses with updated data to
extend the scope and disclose more interesting facts regarding how China’s new rural
pension fulfills its social functions.
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CHAPTER II
LINEAGE DISCREPANCY IN GRANDPARENTAL IMPACTS: DO
GIRLS BENEFIT MORE FROM THE MATRILATERAL BIAS? AN
EVALUATION USING CHINESE HOUSEHOLD DATA
2.1 Introduction and Literature
2.1.1 Grandparents as Childcare Givers
Grandparents play crucial roles in families. Neugarten and Weinstein (1964) summa-
rized these roles into four major types: “fun seeker, formal carer, reservoir of family
wisdom and surrogate parent” (Lou and Chi, 2012). More recent studies (Kornhaber,
1996; Thiele and Whelan, 2006; Sheehan and Petrovic, 2008) have integrated more
functions of grandparents and described them as “daily life helpers, advisors, educa-
tors and transmitters of tradition” (Lou and Chi, 2012). Without any doubt, Grand-
parenthood is an important potential source of family support and ties (Barranti,
1985).
Among all the said functions, the duty of childcare giver stands out. Grand-
parents are usually the major caregivers other than parents, both in the developed
world and the developing countries such like China (Goh, 2006; Goh and Kuczyn-
ski, 2010; Chen et al., 2011; Chen, 2014). Across Europe, 44% of grandmothers and
42% of grandfathers helped give childcare, whether regularly or occasionally (Glaser
et al., 2013). While in America, close to 7% of all grandparents provided extensive
grandchild care-giving (Fuller-Thomson and Minkler, 2001). Families from the devel-
oping countries rely even more on intergenerational support. Sichimba (2015) found
22
“rather high prevalence of grand-parental involvement in childcare” in Zambia. Jiang
et al. (2007) confirmed that “grandparents were the primary caretakers of children in
the three-generation families” in urban China. 58% of Chinese grandparents provide
childcare to their grandchildren (Ko and Hank, 2014), which is considered a very high
ratio, and spend as much time as the mother does when live with their grandchildren
(Chen et al., 2011). The inevitable use of co-residing grandparents in daily childcare
reemphasized their roles “in terms of home education of the young, workforce support
for young parents, cultural identity within families and community capacity building”
(Nyland et al., 2009), which have been evolving over time as demographic features
keep changing and modernization undergoes (Hsu, 1985; Shek, 2006; Settles et al.,
2009). No matter how the grandparental functions are worded, the essence always lays
in the connection to their grandchildren, and deserves deeper understanding under
this particular living arrangement.
2.1.2 Grandparental Impacts in Multi-generational Households
Grandparents generally affect grandchildren from two channels. One is direct involve-
ment through their presence in the household, and the other one is through parents.
Parents as the middle generation, and mothers particularly, play a critical role in de-
veloping grandparent-grandchildren relations (Holladay et al., 1998). It is reasonable
to assume that education received and beliefs inherited from grandparents, along with
interaction patterns between grandparents and parents would somehow help shape
the relationship of parents and their own kids and hence indirectly influence the
kids. In this paper, I focus on the first channel, namely the direct involvement in
multi-generational households.
Pérez et al. (2007) showed that coresidence with grandparents improved human
capital accumulation and health care of grandchildren in Brazil and Peru. Jiang et al.
(2007) emphasized the dominant position of grandparents in “shaping children’s eating
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behavior in some three-generation families in Chinese urban areas”. According to Zeng
and Xie (2014), co-residing rural Chinese grandparents had direct influence on their
grandchildren’s schooling, and the size of which was even close to the size of parental
effect. It was also found in Taiwan that grandparents living in the same household
positively affected educational achievement of grandchildren (Pong and Chen, 2010;
Chiang and Park, 2015). Based on the findings of Li et al. (2015), grandparental
involvement and domination of diet habit significantly contributed to an increase in
probability of children overweight/obesity. Reynolds et al. (2018) found that living
with grandparents improved children’s language development using Chilean data.
Grandparental effects allegedly differ by the lineage of grandparents. Maternal
grandparents, particularly maternal grandmothers, cared about child well-being more
than did paternal grandparents (Euler and Weitzel, 1996; Danielsbacka et al., 2011;
Tanskanen and Danielsbacka, 2012; Danielsbacka et al., 2015; Pashos, 2017a,b; Daly
and Perry, 2017). In a survey of Harwood (2000), maternal grandparents felt sig-
nificantly closer to their grandchildren than did paternal grandparents. Pollet et al.
(2009) exhibited using a UK dataset that compared with paternal grandparents, ma-
ternal grandparents “provided a significantly wider range of financial benefits” for
the newborn. Sear et al. (2000) tested a sample from rural Gambia and found that
only maternal grandmothers might “improve the nutritional status of children signif-
icantly”. Similarly, Tanskanen and Danielsbacka (2012) showed that only maternal
grandparents’ involvement was positively associated with better psychological health
of children. Kirchengast and Putz (2016) analyzed 272 students at University of Vi-
enna and concluded that maternal grandmothers had the highest level of solicitude,
while paternal grandfathers the lowest. Theoretically, this lineage heterogeneity in
grandparental bonds was addressed by proposing the matrilateral bias hypothesis,
which is introduced in the subsection below. This paper aims to reapproach the
said hypothesis and explore its interlinkage with child gender within the coresidence
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setting where grandparents inevitably communicate to children more or less.
2.1.3 Matrilateral Bias Hypothesis (MBH)
The matrilateral bias in grandparental solicitude and involvement, which has been
repeatedly recognized by anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists, is believed
from the evolutionary perspective to root in the fact of patrilineal uncertainty (Gaulin
et al., 1997; Chrastil et al., 2006; Tanskanen et al., 2011; Perry and Daly, 2017). Com-
pared with female, male faces larger uncertainty in and hence higher opportunity costs
to verify whether his offspring indeed carry his genetic information. The hypothesis
indicates that paternal kin have subconsciously developed a tendency to invest less
in the offspring either emotionally or financially to minimize potential losses. This
statement may also receive support from the field of economics. Rational and risk-
averse people always act in a way of controlling possible losses in risky situations.
On the contrary, without such uncertainty, maternal kin are consistently willing to
support and invest in the offspring. We can say that the observed bias originates not
from the overinvestment of maternal side, but rather from the underinvestment of
paternal side.
Well-educated modern generations will perhaps find the above reasoning ridiculous
and unacceptable under increasingly complete social norms and moral codes that pro-
mote equality over genders. However, humans as animals after all, have the instinct
deep down in the subconscious to spread and pass down their genes. A particular in-
dividual could neither have any idea of nor act in line with such an instinct, and even
abhor similar thoughts. But individual preference does not necessarily contradict the
certain pattern showing up in groups, cohorts and populations. With that said, I do
not doubt that the contemporary morality helps suppress this tendency and shrink
the gap in investments on children.
Empirically, researchers were able to identify this bias but having difficulty fully
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interpreting it in terms of the hypothesis. For example, Chan and Elder (2000) con-
firmed a bias from the maternal side by exploring rural Iowan data, which was simply
due to higher sample frequency of parental intimacy with maternal grandparents.
Pashos (2017a, 2018) acknowledged that matrilateral relatives provide more child-
care, yet he attributed the difference to “cultural variety” and a more solid mother-
to-maternal-relatives relationship. Considering the huge challenge of proving the
subconscious functioning, I am not surprised by the current findings.
2.1.4 Coresidence and Son Preference in China
China has a rather large proportion of multi-generational coresidence. The Confucian
morality and emphasis on filial piety, which have been incorporated into social norms
for thousands of years, praise adult children for living with and well serving their
elderly parents (Yan et al., 2003; Pimentel and Liu, 2005; Shek, 2006; Zhang et al.,
2014). Being constantly advocated by national media, it is believed to be a noble
virtue to take good care of one’s own parents and in-laws as well. In such a context,
coresidence of three or more generations remains common in many Chinese families
(Logan et al., 1998; Pimentel and Liu, 2005; Goh, 2006; Chen et al., 2011) and also
preferred by elderly parents (Sereny, 2011; Yu and Yan, 2016) as an institution of
elder support. Although economic growth and urbanization would have increased the
number of nuclear families, Tsui (1989) predicted that “a rapid decrease in stem fam-
ilies is not likely in the near future” under impacts of social, cultural and traditional
norms. Moreover, Wang (2014) found a large fall in the share of nuclear families
and an increase in the share of linear families in rural China since 2000 using the
sixth national census data. A more recent research by Lei et al. (2015) indicated that
“roughly 41% of Chinese aged 60 and over live with an adult child”, and another 48%
live close to their children. As pointed out by Davis and Harrell (1993), locationally
separated households may still function as a whole. These closely located households
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form a small and intimate network where families provide support to each other, and
to some extent can be seen as a coresidence arrangement (quasi-coresidence). The
proximity of the grandparent(s), according to Whitbeck et al. (1993) and Kennedy
(1992), did strongly increase grandparent-grandchild communication and closeness.
Thus China, with a background of wide coresidence, is an ideal domain for researchers
to explore the evolution in the grandparental roles as well as observe the co-residing
impacts on children through grandparent-grandchild interactions.
Chinese families, like many in developing areas, are established on patrilineality
and patrilocality (Pimentel and Liu, 2005; Chen, 2014). The male members (some-
times the firstborn male) of each generation define the family lineage and have the
right to inherit properties. Females were traditionally described as “spilt water” as
they would ultimately, at least in most cases, leave the original family and stay with
the husband’s family after marriage. A married female was no longer seen as a mem-
ber of her original family but rather of the one she married into, where she was
expected to do daily chores, take care of her in-laws, and give birth to children bear-
ing her husband’s surname. The historical yet absurd virtue standard for women was
to be submissive to father before marriage, to husband after marriage, and to son in
widowhood, respectively. Such a cultural background underrepresents the values of
girl, and tends to cultivate son preference which stems from the Confucian ideology
(Arnold and Liu, 1986) and has been especially prevalent in rural China (Tsui and
Rich, 2002; Pimentel and Liu, 2005; Wang, 2005; Jin et al., 2007; Murphy et al., 2011).
Son preference implies discrimination against girls and imbalanced allocation. Com-
pared with girls, boys are better nourished, educated and taken care of. Gong et al.
(2000); Wang (2005); Murphy et al. (2011) verified that families with the preference
invest more resources in boys. Park and Rukumnuaykit (2004) identified strong son
preference and gender bias in nutrition allocation from poorly educated rural fathers.
Song and Burgard (2008) confirmed a height advantage in male Chinese children (af-
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ter controlling for physiological differences) and this advantage became more obvious
in rural areas. Other than those, indirect son preference was as well spotted from
the way other household members were treated. For rural, one-child, and low-income
families, having a first-born son improved the mothers’ bargaining power and nutrient
status (Li and Wu, 2011). Girls with male sibling(s) were less schooled than were girls
with female sibling(s)(Lee, 2012), and would have a significantly lower height-for-age
score before eight years old in rural China (Kubo and Chaudhuri, 2016).
2.1.5 Interplay of Matrilateral Bias and Child Gender
Given the context, I wonder if maternal grandparents hold a different attitude toward
their granddaughter. Since maternal grandparents have raised their own daughter,
would they perceive the value of their granddaughter more comprehensively? In
a country with prevailing son preference like China, how would they influence the
intra-household distribution? Would they encourage balanced allocation of resource
among all children, or surprisingly biased investment toward girl? Could presence of
maternal grandparents in families, although rather rare, narrow down gender gaps in
children growth?1 Despite the claim of no such influence channels along “traditional
kinship lines2” by Creasey and Koblewski (1991), I wish to examine this major issue
with Chinese data from a new angle. Nevertheless this paper principally focuses on
addressing and discussing heterogeneities of grandparental influences by lineage in
multi-generational families.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the data and method-
ology; the third section demonstrates the regression and robustness check results; and
the last section presents the explanations as well as limitations and finally concludes
the paper.
1The elderly parents tend to live with their sons (Lei et al., 2015); living with adult daughters is
uncommon (Cong and Silverstein, 2008).
2For example: granddaughter-maternal grandmother; grandson-paternal grandfather.
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2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Data
The dataset used in the analysis is from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) (In-
stitute Of Social Science Survey, 2019). The CFPS is a nationwide biannual survey
on selected communities, households, and individuals in mainland China. Initially
launched by Peking University in 2010, it collects detailed longitudinal data on mul-
tiple demographic, socioeconomic and ethnic variables. All members over age 9 from
each selected household unit are interviewed and considered core members of the
household. For members below age 9, their proxy respondents (usually parents) are
interviewed instead. There are routine follow-ups of core members and a core mem-
ber would be left out only if dead or outside the survey region. Detailed design and
questionnaires can be found at the official website of the CFPS3.
This current panel covers 499 counties of 31 provinces in China and contains four
waves of survey: 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. Over this time horizon, 13,202 children
below age 16 or their proxy respondents from 8,891 households were interviewed. The
initial and subsequent surveys have together yielded a sample of 29,683 observations
and 2.25 observations per child on average. Table 13, 14 and 15 give a general
idea on the sample size by combinations of a few criteria: gender, age, presence of
grandparents, and the community type. Table 13 lists the observation amounts by
gender and age cohorts in each year, where we can apparently see that children aged 6
to 12 are the majority. Given the long-confirmed skewed sex-ratio and son preference
in China, the sample is relatively gender-balanced. Table 14 shows the numbers of
kids with co-residing grandparents in their households by grandparent lineage and
child gender in each year. In the header row, “No GP” indicates no grandparents in
the household, while “Both Sides” simply implies the presence of both paternal and
maternal grandparents. When grandparents indeed show up, the paternal side is much
3http://www.isss.pku.edu.cn/cfps/en/documentation/questionnaires/index.htm
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more common. This was well expected and already discussed earlier. To summarize,
women in a patrilineal and patrilocal society (like Chinese society) usually either stay
with the husband’s family or form a new household after getting married. From this
table, we see no obvious connections between lineage of co-residing grandparents and
child gender. Table 15 exhibits the sample’s distribution over grandparent lineage and
the community types. There are almost twice as many paternal-side-only households
in rural communities as in urban ones. The number of rural households without any
grandparents is as well larger than the one of urban households. As for the maternal-
side coresidence, no discernible patterns in the community location are found.
2.2.2 The Regression Model
The basic regression model is :
yiht = τ1 · paternalht + τ2 ·maternalht + λ1 · paternalht · girli
+ λ2 ·maternalht · girli +X ′ihtβ + Z ′htδ + αh + γt + µiht
(2.1)
The model employs the fixed effects estimator with standard errors clustered at
the community(village) level. The subscript i denotes individual, h household, and t
time. yiht is the outcome variable we need to explain. paternalht equals one if any
paternal grandparent presents, and zero otherwise. maternalht is a similar indicator
for maternal grandparent. paternalht × girli and maternalht × girli are interacts
of the paternal and maternal dummies with child gender, respectively. Therefore,
estimates τ1, τ2, λ1, and λ2 are what we have interests in. X ′iht and Z ′ht are vectors
of individual and household controls. I included common controls like child gender,
child age, its square and even cube, parental education, parental age and squared age,
grandparental education and age, etc., and also specific controls for the survey design
like parental devotion to education, eagerness to communicate, and expectation on
educational attainment. αh is the unobservable time-invariant factor at household
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level that causes the dependent variable to change. γt captures year effects in the
multi-period sample. And at last, µiht represents the error term.
The outcome variables can be categorized into two groups. Group 1 contains
weight, height, weight-for-age z-score and height-for-age z-score, which are all objec-
tive measures. The weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores are growth measures
standardized using the WHO Anthro macro modules. To have a better understanding
of the construction method, readers are welcome to read the online manual from the
WHO website4. Group 2 contains observables mainly assessing parental investment
and child’s self-recognition, which are self-rated health status, total educational ex-
penditures, self-evaluation on how good and capable a child is as a student and a
student cadre, respectively. Group 1 utilizes the whole sample, while group 2 only
applies to the subsample of school-aged children. Detailed descriptive statistics can
be found in table 16.
2.2.3 Sources of Endogeneity
The unbiasedness and efficiency of an estimator rely on a critical assumption: the
decision of coresidence is exogenous. However, this assumption seems not so plau-
sible on second thought. The living arrangement among generations is an internal
matter to a household, and supposedly associates with some core characteristics that
would absolutely affect the child development. Theoretically, I consider that multi-
generational cooccupation of a housing unit is determined by three major factors :
parental income, grandparental income, and family bonds/traditions.
1. Parental income influencing the coresidence decision: The middle-aged genera-
tion usually is the main income source of a household. The bullet points below
assume some cases where the parents may choose to live with elders to cut costs
under the constraint of income. In these cases, the financial status of parents is
4https://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/
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the key motive for coresidence and sets an upper boundary of resources available
to the children.
• The parents cannot afford a separate housing unit.
• The parents cannot afford a babysitter so use the grandparents as caregiver.
• The parents cannot afford a private nurse for taking care of their elderly
parents.
2. Grandparental income influencing the coresidence decision: it has been a widely
spotted phenomenon that the old generation supports their adult children with
income, pension, or annuity. Hence grandparental income affects the growth of
grandchildren indirectly. The elders may choose to stay with their children when
the following occasions present, where income is again the pivotal determinant.
• The grandparents do not have or have lost income sources.
• The grandparents are too old or sick to take care of themselves, and are
unable to afford a private nurse.
3. Family bonds/traditions influencing the coresidence decision: The cultural and
social values, as well as personal preference matter too. Sometimes several
generations live together simply because they have solid emotional bonds or
local traditions do not encourage separation of a household.
• The parents are morally obliged to live with and take care of their elderly
parents.
• The family share strong internal bonds and cherish a unified multi-generational
household.
All the factors have either straightforward or latent influences on child growth,
which need to be addressed in the model. Tables 17 and 18 summarize the most pop-
ular predictors of living arrangement used in literature. Age, income, physical needs,
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and marital status of the elderly, housing costs, social norms, and economic growth
are some major covariates. Among all the relevant variables, income and intergenera-
tional support are what actually have direct influences on growth measures. To avoid
any potential bias from the entangled two-way interplay between living condition and
family/individual income, instead of using the actual income, I used education as a
proxy.
Table 19 showcases the correlation between grandparental coresidence and some of
the major covariates. Other than the “paternal” and “maternal” dummies introduced
earlier, another indicator “GP” was also analyzed. “GP” equals one if any grandparent,
regardless of lineage, stays in the household, and zero if no grandparents. For each
indicator I ran two modules. Module 1 utilizes the same set of covariates used in
the main equation, and module 2 adds in parental income on the basis of module 1.
Nevertheless, the additional covariates did not yield any big differences. Although
statistically significant, the correlation estimates are way too small.
In general, the results nicely align with our knowledge of coresidence in China.
Grandchild’s gender shows no obvious correlations. Older age and better health of
grandchild are negatively associated with grandparental stay-around, especially of
the paternal side. As a kid gets older and is in good health condition, grandparental
assistance would be less needed in the household. Moreover, the increase in age of
either kid or parent beyond some certain cutoffs implies a higher probability of grand-
parental decease. The presence of mother is negatively associated with paternal-side
coresidence but positively with maternal-side. It may suggest that in most cases where
mother is absent it is paternal grandparents that step in to take domestic responsi-
bilities, yet maternal grandparents incline to enter the family through the mother.
The amount of maternal siblings negatively correlates to maternal grandparent’s pres-
ence, and the amount of paternal ones to paternal grandparent’s. With more parental
siblings, the chance of taking grandparents into one’s household is smaller as every
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sibling shares the obligation more or less. Mother’s education is negatively related
to paternal grandparent’s presence while positively to maternal grandparent’s. Bet-
ter educated women favor forming a new household and living independently. Last
but not least, urbanization has negative correlation with the elder generation’s stay-
around. Hiking land price restricts home space available to common families and
deprives the ground of multi-generational coresidence.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 A Simple OLS Setting
Before applying the fixed effects approach, I ran a simple OLS estimation on the
controlled covariates. The results are shown in table 20. The weight-for-age and
height-for-age z-scores range from -6 to 5 and -6 to 6, respectively. They are physical
records generalized and standardized across the entire sample. Their values mark
relative positions of individuals in the sample’s distribution rather than reflecting
actual body statistics. Therefore, they are expected to be less sensitive to controls at
individual and household levels (for example, a very small R2) yet more explainable
to provincial characteristics. Health status is a 1-to-7 scale for subjective evalua-
tion of health. In table 20, paternal grandparent is overall related to less weight,
smaller height-for-age, and worse health. One conjecture is that grandparent’s help
with childcare is requested when child develops at a little slower pace, and paternal
grandparent is the more common option. However, paternal grandparent is positively
correlated with weight and maternal grandparent with weight-for-age when the kid is
a girl. Parent’s devotion to child’s education and expectation on child’s educational
attainment are positively correlated to the physical measures. Kids with better edu-
cated parents or grandparents develop better, and urban kids are significantly taller.
Regarding how successful and capable a school-aged kid considers herself, girls on
average generate a higher rating. Maternal grandparent is a sign of more educational
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investment overall, yet less for girls. Higher parental expectation on educational at-
tainment implies extra investment and better self assessment of child. Larger amount
of investment likely takes place in households where parents or grandparents have
nicer educational background. Given the inequality in educational resources between
urban and rural regions, urban students are unsurprisingly invested more.
The purpose of the OLS practice is to draw a big picture of underlying mecha-
nisms between the outcome variables and the determinants. At this stage, no causal
inferences can be made. The signs of estimates are more informative than the sizes
as they imply directions of comovement.
2.3.2 A Fixed Effects Setting
Table 21 exhibits the estimates of the main regression model. Many previously identi-
fied correlations lost significance after incorporating the household fixed effects. The
change suggests that the correlations were probably driven by the unobservable yet
broadly influential household characteristics.
Girls physiologically weigh less by about half of a kilogram than boys, yet a 0.16
negative impact of being a girl on weight-for-age signifies that girls are worse nourished
in an institutional way. Presence of paternal grandparent enhances an average child’s
weight by 0.8. Unexpectedly, presence of maternal grandparent brings a decrease of
0.5 that cannot be ignored to the pooled weight-for-age. This could be resulted from
sample features or some unknown reasons. For example, a maternal grandparent
only moves into her daughter’s home when she has no external supports at all. Then
such a move-in is equivalent to a negative income shock to the family. Other than the
sample-wide impacts, no particular grandparental impacts on girls’ physical measures
were singled out.
Parent’s eagerness to communicate mildly improves child’s health scale by one
fifth. Active communication typically builds up a solid parent-child relationship and
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helps parents gain trust from their kids. Therefore, parents who are enthusiastic to
communicate are able to learn their children’s needs and conditions more easily and
promptly. Parent’s expectation on higher educational attainment ensures that daily
necessities of child are well satisfied, hence through which slightly adjusts height,
height-for-age, and weight-for-age.
Girls show more confidence in carrying duties of student cadre with an extra 0.3 in
self rating of capability. Maternal grandparent has a positive impact of 1.8 across the
whole sample on the said rating, which is enough for a clean upgrade. Interestingly,
this impact turned negative when it comes to girls only. Thus, we can imagine that
the encouragement for becoming a student cadre from maternal grandparents to boys
must be even larger than 1.8. On the other hand, maternal grandparent does make
girl’s self evaluation of well-behaving as a student (not including academic perfor-
mance) increase by 0.56. In the following subsection I would discuss an explanation
that reconciles these seemingly contradictory findings.
Mother’s educational level lowers self evaluation of cadre competency. “Paternal
grandparents’ highest education” represents the highest educational achievement be-
tween the couple, either dead or alive, in the family or not. It places an upward
tendency on self acknowledgment of being a remarkable student. In China, grand-
parents usually have an image of being spoiling. They give grandchildren whatever
they ask, overcompensate them for punishments received from their parents, and de-
fend them whenever they argue with parents. Grandparents can be the moderator
between two generations. They make children’s life easier when parents are too strict
and resolve lurking conflicts before they strike.
2.3.3 Robustness Check Using Lewbel’s Heteroskedasticity-based Instru-
ments (HBIV)
Lewbel (2012) introduced this identification strategy for linear models as an alterna-
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tive to the conventional IV approach when the latter is unavailable, and I happened
to have this problem. The basic idea is to construct internal instruments based on
heteroskedastic errors and the product of which needs to be uncorrelated with the
chosen regressors to achieve identification. The only requirement is mostly satisfied
in many models and especially applies to mine, where endogeneity arises from some
unobservable common factors. Later in 2018, Lewbel (2018) proved that the strategy
is as well valid for endogenous treatment indicators. This paper does not intend to
theoretically justify the method at this time as the job has been done by quite a few
papers. For better knowledge, Quiroga (2018) discussed pros and cons of the strategy
in details and Baum and Lewbel (2019) elaborated some caveats for application.
Many researchers have already applied the HBIV approach and obtained robust
findings. Mishra and Smyth (2015) compared it with the standard IV in a study
of returns to schooling using urban China samples and found the estimates were
“plausibly similar”. Posso (2017) employed it to examine child Labor’s effect on
long-run earnings and reported consistent results across multiple trials. Emran and
Hou (2013) and Radoias and Kim (2015) as well supplemented the rationale with
additional convincing outcomes based on this identification. Accordingly, I used the
said method to test the robustness of my analysis from a different perspective.
Table 22 summarizes what I got. The one fifth downward bias on girl’s weight-
for-age confirms the existence of an institutional nourishment gap between boys and
girls. The paternal-side coresidence has a small yet significant negative impact on
child’s health status, which is inconsistent with the fixed effects model. Other than
that, there are no evident grandparental effects on body measures.
Parent’s devotion to child’s education gently increases height, height-for-age and
health status. Parent’s eagerness to communicate raises health status by about 0.2.
Parent’s expectation on educational attainment improves height by 0.77 cm, weight-
for-age, height-for-age, and health status slightly as well. The widespread positive
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impacts from these factors, though some are insignificant, reconfirm the results of the
basic model, and also reveal an important fact. Parents’ attitudes toward children
greatly depend on the attitudes of their parents toward them. It is unconvincing
to say that the said factors are not affected by grandparents at all. Rather than
directly imposing influences on grandchildren, grandparents unintentionally deliver
their impacts through parents. The positive impacts of parent’s and grandparent’s
education also speak for this argument.
Girls on average have better self evaluation of student’s well-behaving and cadre
capability than boys. The presence of paternal grandparents raises self appraisal on
cadre capability by 0.1. Total education expenditures increase by 1,248 yuan for
all at the presence of maternal grandparent, while decrease by 1,555 yuan for girls
only. A reasonable explanation is that maternal grandparents shift many educational
resources form girls to boys, either by their own decisions or through manipulating
parent’s decisions. If we recall the conflicting fixed effects estimates of maternal grand-
parent’s influences on girl’s self-rated fulfillment of student duties and competence of
being a cadre, we may see the possible underlying logic here. Maternal grandparents
expect girls to develop in a way where they merely abide by student codes, behave well
at school, and accomplish repetitive tasks everyday, but do not stand out to run for a
cadre position, pursue an unnecessary educational attainment, or demonstrate their
talents and creativity. Maternal grandparents want girls to “stay low” rather than to
catch others’ attention. This belief could be from protective minds or conservative
preferences deep down, which we do not know for sure.
Unsurprisingly, parent’s high hope on educational attainment has significant and
wide impacts on child’s overall performance relating to school. Children are receiving
more investment on education and more confident in self assessments. Parent’s and
grandparent’s level of education has a positive effect on the educational investment
in children. Among the four covariates mother’s education is the most influential,
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whose one unit advance adds 434 yuan to the average expense.
Some statistics from the first stages and the joint tests are exhibited in the bottom
part of table 22 for each outcome variable. Cragg and Donald (1993) promoted the
Cragg-Donald F-statistic as an improvement to the standard one. Yet in my case,
with more than one endogenous regressors being instrumented for and standard errors
clustered at the community level (namely the sample is not i.i.d.), the Cragg-Donald
F-statistic is no longer valid. I instead report the Sanderson-Windmeijer statistic
for the weak-identification test of a particular variable (Sanderson and Windmeijer,
2016). The Sanderson-Windmeijer test can be seen as a more generalized procedure
than the Cragg-Donald test, as it addresses both the situations of multiple endoge-
nous variables and robust standard errors. In the “special” case of a single endogenous
variable, the Sanderson-Windmeijer statistic is identical to the Cragg-Donald statis-
tic (if the sample is i.i.d.) or the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic (if the sample is
clustered).5 The test statistics of the four endogenous regressors are significant for
all the outcome variables, which indicate the rejection of weak identification. To test
whether the models are overall underidentified, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM procedure
has been invoked (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). The null hypothesis suggesting under-
identification is rejected at all levels for every model. At last, the Sargan-Hansen test
statistic whose joint null hypothesis implies the validity of instruments is reported.
Based on the P-values of Hansen’s J-statistics6, I fail to reject that these instruments
are valid. To summarize, the first-stage statistics have offered plenty of supports
to the reliability of Lewbel’s method, and the findings from HBIV basically agree
with those of the main model except for the specific impacts of paternal grandparent
on a child’s physical measures. In the section below, I discuss the implications and
limitations of the results.
5Kleibergen and Paap (2006) proposed a variation to the Cragg-Donald statistic to release the
i.i.d. presumption embedded in the latter one.
6The Hansen’s J-statistic is presented as the consistent statistic with a clustered sample.
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2.4 Conclusion and Discussion
Using data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), I found no strong and
consistent supports for direct grandparental influences on selected characteristics of
grandchildren, nor for the matrilateral bias hypothesis. However, there were signs of
indirect grandparental impacts through the middle generation. Regarding the hypoth-
esis, literature holds a few counter-examples. Pashos (2000) showed that the direction
of lineage bias changes across geographical locations. In Germany and urban Greece,
maternal grandparents gave more solicitude; while in rural Greece, it was paternal
grandparents who provided more care. Dubas (2001) found that granddaughters
did not feel closer to maternal grandparents than did grandsons, and grandsons did
not hold more intimate relations to maternal grandmothers than to paternal grand-
mothers. Smorti et al. (2012) found that relative to maternal grandparents, paternal
grandparents spent more time with grandchildren using an Italian sample. Kaptijn
et al. (2012) examined both Dutch and Chinese data, and the findings validated the
hypothesis in the Netherlands while denied it in China. These studies left a question
mark on the existence of the supposedly universal matrilateral bias. If the bias does
exist, it does not necessarily strengthen relationships between maternal grandparents
and grandchildren.
As for the context of this research, one must realize that patriarchy still domi-
nates Chinese families nowadays (Jankowiak and Moore, 2016; Chien and Yi, 2014).
A married female would leave her original household and stay with her husband’s
family members, if not establish a new household. Chinese value the pass-down of
family name, yet there is not much help from girls whose children carry the family
name of their spouse. The conservative norms undermined people’s appreciation of
female, forged female’s image as “negative equity” and emphasized female’s inferior
social position. For example, parents, especially rural parents, regard marriage by a
certain age as the first priority for their daughter, and often disagree with pursuit of
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higher educational attainment (Wang, 2005). In such a context where discrimination
was institutionalized, any investment in a girl beyond necessity could be considered
irrational and meaningless.
My conjecture of maternal grandparents as parents of girls showing extra solicitude
or “sympathy” to granddaughters found no grounds and remains for further examina-
tion. One or two estimates suggest that maternal grandparents favor grandsons over
granddaughters and incline to shift resources to boys. The maternal grandparents
may occasionally feel “losing twice” when look at their granddaughters, and hence
attempt to compensate themselves for inability to raise their own son through cut-
ting investment in granddaughters or showing more care toward grandsons. We can
boldly imagine that the “sense of failure” is even augmented in families restricted by
the one-child policy, which leaves no space for future “correction”. Unlike what my
assumption implies, the experience of raising a daughter could reinforce the stereo-
types instead of eliminating them after perceiving the socioeconomic inferiority more
acutely.
One’s life experience does not always make a person reflect on and correct the
mistreatments she received. It may turn out to intensify any existing obsession.
Although off topic, we have seem many real world examples. Women who suffered
from their mother-in-laws are even more harsh to their daughter-in-laws; who were
discriminated against as a girl show more hatred to their own daughters; and who
could not choose freely deprive their daughters’ right to choose. After all, it is much
easier to strengthen one’s beliefs than to alter them.
Deeper understanding of this topic will help improve gender equality and increase
national investment in primary education. Although the rapid modernization and
urbanization in China attenuate son preference to a degree, gender discrimination
still has its roots in rural areas. With agricultural jobs being the main income source,
male population stands for potential labor force, namely more wealth in the future.
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Therefore, to eliminate gender discrimination inevitably relies on comprehensive and
complete modernization and urbanization.Murphy et al. (2011) also emphasized that
son preference is likely to die off over time as income grows.
This paper has its limitations and leaves space for future improvements. Forming
a multi-generational household can hardly be an exogenous decision. It is related to
the internal conditions of a family. One way to bypass the endogeneity issue is to
restrict the sample to households with co-residing grandparents long before the first
kid was born. Regardless of the specific reason of living together, the presence of
grandparents can be seen as exogenous when the kid was born. This is infeasible for
the CFPS dataset as the restricted sample is too small to yield any valid estimate.
There are plenty studies on grandparental impacts in the U.S. and Europe where son
preference is not prevalent, and it may as well be inspiring to take a look at other
developing countries with gender preference. Last but not least, to sort out house-
holds into “boys only”, “girls only”, and “both genders” and then examine each type
separately will no doubt add more credits to the current research. Since my approach
relies on fixed effects at household level, one drawback of which is that information
of households with only one child or children of the same gender is excluded as it
generates no household-level variations. This is a trade-off situation. Including fixed
effects at least would remove disturbances from unobservable factors relating to family
traditions, yet given the aforementioned concern, separation of the sample according
to gender constitution of children is meaningful. This practice was not conducted for
the current dataset because a large decrease in sample size could further undermine
the universality of analysis.
This paper has its contributions to the literature regarding household structures
and intergenerational relationships. First, it clearly summarized the determinants
of coresidence decision identified so far from an aged person’s perspective for future
reference. Second, it completed a trial of verifying the MBH using a dataset on
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China, whose conclusions call for further examination of validity of the hypothesis and
deeper understanding of Chinese family formation. Third, it addressed both direct
and indirect channels where grandparents may impose influences on grandchildren
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Figure 1: The distribution of the post-policy sample: participation ratio in each
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Figure 2: The distribution of the post-policy sample: gender and living location
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
Female Male
Gender ratios of participants by year
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
Urban Town Rural
Neighborhood classifications of participants
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Figure 3: The distribution of the post-policy sample: self-evaluated health and alter-
native pension enrollment
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
Very bad Bad Moderate
Good Very good
Self-evaluated health of participants by year
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
Not enrolled Enrolled
Enrollment of alternative pensions by year
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Figure 4: The distribution of the post-policy sample: pre-retirement career and major
support source
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
professional and technical institutional or managerial commercial, service, industrial
self-employed agriculture, forestry, husbandry houseworker
military never worked others
Pre-retirement careers of participants
1st round after policy 2nd round after policy
Retirement wages Spouse Child(ren)
Grandchild(ren) Other relative(s) Local government 
Work by self Others No other means
Major financial sources of participants
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Figure 5: The matching results based on the selected explanatory variables
-40 -20 0 20 40
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
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Propensity Score
Treated: on support Treated: off support
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Table 1: Potential determinants of the enrollment decision
Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
Age 0.086∗∗ 0.051 0.106∗∗ 0.082
(0.040) (0.052) (0.044) (0.056)
Financial Support: -0.288∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
Spouse (0.068) (0.089) (0.073) (0.097)
Financial Support: -0.305∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
Child(ren) (0.046) (0.062) (0.050) (0.070)
Financial Support: -0.384∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
Grandchild(ren) (0.072) (0.080) (0.079) (0.094)
Financial Support: -0.451∗∗ -0.567∗∗ -0.419∗ -0.588∗
Other Relative(s) (0.178) (0.277) (0.237) (0.339)
Financial Support: -0.335∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
Local Government (0.054) (0.074) (0.059) (0.081)
Financial Support: -0.309∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
Work by Self (0.051) (0.069) (0.055) (0.077)
Household Income Per 0.006∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.007
Capita (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Other Pensions -0.182∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.140∗
(0.049) (0.069) (0.052) (0.073)
Rice + Wheat 0.072∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.073∗
(0.031) (0.040) (0.033) (0.043)
Daily Consumption -0.008∗∗ -0.007 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗
of Staple Food (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
# of Serious Illness -0.004∗ -0.003 -0.005∗∗ -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Decide My Own 0.122∗ 0.161∗
Spending (0.068) (0.083)
Decide Self & Some 0.151∗∗ 0.199∗∗
Household’s Spending (0.077) (0.091)
Decide Almost 0.177∗∗ 0.224∗∗
Every Spending (0.080) (0.095)
Net Transfers from 0.029 0.064∗∗
Children (0.023) (0.031)
Net Transfers from -0.087∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
Grandchildren (0.041) (0.031)
Observations 8466 6488 7610 5862
R2 0.112 0.131 0.118 0.144
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level.
Net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Tests of differences between participants and non-participants using a pooled
sample (before matching)
Before the policy
Variables G1(0) Mean1 G2(1) Mean2 MeanDiff
Heart Rate 3298 72.760 857 72.978 0.217
Systolic Pressure 3299 132.182 856 133.025 0.842
Diastolic Pressure 3291 80.594 853 80.760 0.166
Health (Interviewer Rated) 3332 3.240 868 3.271 0.030
Health (Self Rated) 3275 3.493 858 3.561 0.067*
Life Quality 3274 3.594 858 3.638 0.044
Sleep Quality 3329 3.649 868 3.706 0.057*
Net Transfers from Children 3220 0.150 822 0.160 0.009
Net Transfers from Grandchildren 3235 -0.000 824 0.004 0.004
Deciding Family Spending 3104 2.541 810 2.735 0.193***
Deciding for Self 3332 3.672 868 3.774 0.103**
Preference for Independent Living 3249 1.649 855 1.651 -0.003
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: G1(0) is the number of non-participants; G2(1) is the number of participants.
Note: Net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
Table 3: Number of observations by gender and enrollment in each round
Female Male Total
Round Not enrolled Enrolled Total Not enrolled Enrolled Total Not enrolled Enrolled Total
1 788 • 788 592 • 592 1,380 • 1,380
2 788 • 788 592 • 592 1,380 • 1,380
3 550 238 788 408 184 592 958 422 1,380
4 488 300 788 381 211 592 869 511 1,380
Note: •indicates no applicable observations.
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Table 4: Tests of differences between matched participants and non-participants using
a pooled sample
Before the policy
Variables G1(0) Mean1 G2(1) Mean2 MeanDiff
Heart Rate 1904 73.098 837 72.986 -0.113
Systolic Pressure 1903 132.591 836 133.109 0.518
Diastolic Pressure 1898 80.305 833 80.795 0.491
Health (Interviewer Rated) 1916 3.263 844 3.271 0.008
Health (Self Rated) 1889 3.522 835 3.557 0.034
Life Quality 1888 3.614 835 3.631 0.017
Sleep Quality 1915 3.693 844 3.697 0.003
Net Transfers from Children 1858 0.164 802 0.160 -0.003
Net Transfers from Grandchildren 1867 -0.003 804 0.004 0.007
Deciding Family Spending 1774 2.601 789 2.741 0.140***
Deciding for Self 1916 3.729 844 3.773 0.044
Preference for Independent Living 1873 1.652 833 1.649 -0.002
After the policy
Variables G1(0) Mean1 G2(1) Mean2 MeanDiff
Heart Rate 1894 74.448 834 74.283 -0.165
Systolic Pressure 1899 109.341 836 107.914 -1.426**
Diastolic Pressure 1893 108.851 835 107.234 -1.617***
Health (Interviewer Rated) 1903 3.074 840 3.171 0.098***
Health (Self Rated) 1857 3.298 820 3.417 0.119***
Life Quality 1856 3.657 819 3.816 0.158***
Sleep Quality 1912 3.595 840 3.642 0.047
Net Transfers from Children 1794 0.228 782 0.225 -0.003
Net Transfers from Grandchildren 1714 0.016 770 0.010 -0.006
Deciding Family Spending 1503 2.460 652 2.592 0.132***
Deciding for Self 1912 3.691 844 3.774 0.083
Preference for Independent Living 1822 1.668 809 1.663 -0.005
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: G1(0) is the number of non-participants; G2(1) is the number of participants.
Note: Net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
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Table 5: Difference-in-difference estimates of pension effects on the elderly
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
Policy Begins 4.317 -15.503∗ 13.344∗ 0.374 -0.890∗ -0.334
(5.502) (8.671) (6.874) (0.386) (0.466) (0.439)
DID 0.113 -2.721∗∗ -2.412∗∗ -0.006 0.161∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.691) (1.245) (1.006) (0.050) (0.061) (0.066)
Age -0.484 0.142 0.795 0.066 0.051 0.040
(0.775) (1.328) (1.053) (0.056) (0.067) (0.070)
Rural 0.932 -1.961 -1.017 0.118∗ -0.097 -0.030
(1.108) (2.017) (1.562) (0.071) (0.093) (0.099)
Schooling -0.706∗ -1.078∗∗ -0.466 -0.012 0.006 -0.043
(0.387) (0.521) (0.582) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028)
Household Income -0.021 0.176 0.125 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.002
Per Capita (0.072) (0.125) (0.097) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
# of Co-residing 0.051 -0.063 -0.067 -0.086∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.005
People (0.106) (0.202) (0.158) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Daily Consumption 0.096 0.014 -0.164 0.005 -0.000 0.013∗
of Staple Food (0.071) (0.134) (0.103) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
# of Serious Illness 0.011 0.205 0.063 -0.005 -0.011 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.159) (0.161) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
BMI Index -0.008 0.169∗ 0.078 -0.004 0.008∗∗ 0.004
(0.051) (0.089) (0.063) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 95.355∗ 141.991∗ 7.414 -0.217 -1.797 2.227
(49.650) (80.161) (63.875) (3.556) (4.201) (4.172)
Observations 4648 4650 4638 4562 4607 4677
R2 0.361 0.622 0.729 0.539 0.444 0.479
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; income is in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Difference-in-difference estimates of pension effects on the elderly (Ctd.)
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
Policy Begins -0.385 -1.391∗∗∗ 0.284 -0.043 0.097 0.049
(0.298) (0.454) (0.596) (0.660) (0.208) (0.076)
DID 0.091∗∗ 0.103 -0.052 -0.022 0.032 -0.016
(0.045) (0.068) (0.085) (0.094) (0.030) (0.019)
Age 0.108∗∗ 0.169∗∗ -0.012 0.230∗∗ -0.014 -0.008
(0.047) (0.070) (0.088) (0.103) (0.033) (0.015)
Rural -0.040 -0.065 -0.036 -0.146 -0.007 0.007
(0.068) (0.094) (0.146) (0.160) (0.044) (0.018)
Schooling 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.003 -0.005 -0.006
(0.021) (0.037) (0.036) (0.045) (0.018) (0.019)
Household Income 0.006 0.007 -0.016∗ 0.011 0.006 -0.002
Per Capita (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002)
# of Co-residing 0.002 0.023∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.002 -0.000
People (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.002)
Daily Consumption 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.000
of Staple Food (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001)
# of Serious Illness -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.004 0.001∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001)
BMI Index 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -1.397 -6.720 5.177 -2.671 -0.117 0.377
(2.794) (4.229) (5.447) (6.139) (1.974) (0.850)
Observations 4670 4609 4071 4680 4479 4415
R2 0.463 0.463 0.571 0.427 0.402 0.296
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; income and net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Difference-in-difference estimates of pension effects on the elderly by mem-
bership length
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
Policy Begins 4.305 -15.404∗ 13.169∗ 0.362 -0.882∗ -0.322
(5.501) (8.696) (6.881) (0.385) (0.466) (0.439)
DID for Round 0.634 -1.417 2.070∗ 0.126∗∗ -0.026 -0.045
4 Enrollees (0.826) (1.611) (1.228) (0.063) (0.078) (0.081)
DID for Round -0.246 -2.666 -2.351∗ 0.053 0.106 -0.014
3 Enrollees (0.919) (1.683) (1.405) (0.069) (0.089) (0.100)
DID for Round 0.757 -3.550∗∗ -1.318 0.016 0.191∗∗ 0.127
3 & 4 Enrollees (0.930) (1.676) (1.331) (0.066) (0.077) (0.083)
Age -0.528 0.225 0.676 0.060 0.052 0.041
(0.776) (1.325) (1.057) (0.056) (0.067) (0.070)
Rural 0.921 -1.965 -1.010 0.122∗ -0.100 -0.034
(1.106) (2.023) (1.552) (0.072) (0.093) (0.099)
Schooling -0.696∗ -1.095∗∗ -0.444 -0.012 0.007 -0.042
(0.389) (0.520) (0.587) (0.035) (0.027) (0.028)
Household Income -0.022 0.178 0.122 -0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.002
Per Capita (0.072) (0.125) (0.097) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
# of Co-residing 0.050 -0.061 -0.069 -0.086∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.005
People (0.106) (0.201) (0.158) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Daily Consumption 0.097 0.013 -0.163 0.006 -0.000 0.013∗
of Staple Food (0.071) (0.133) (0.103) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
# of Serious Illness 0.011 0.205 0.062 -0.005 -0.010 -0.024∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.160) (0.160) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
BMI Index -0.008 0.171∗ 0.075 -0.004 0.008∗∗ 0.005
(0.052) (0.091) (0.062) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 97.543∗∗ 137.789∗ 13.352 0.124 -1.820 2.189
(49.680) (79.985) (63.873) (3.533) (4.190) (4.174)
Observations 4648 4650 4638 4562 4607 4677
R2 0.362 0.622 0.729 0.540 0.444 0.479
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; income is in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Difference-in-difference estimates of pension effects on the elderly by mem-
bership length (Ctd.)
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
Policy Begins -0.388 -1.388∗∗∗ 0.338 -0.033 0.099 0.048
(0.298) (0.454) (0.586) (0.661) (0.209) (0.076)
DID for Round 0.012 0.009 -0.214∗∗ -0.051 -0.014 -0.016
4 Enrollees (0.057) (0.082) (0.104) (0.118) (0.040) (0.016)
DID for Round 0.106∗ 0.072 -0.263∗∗ -0.079 0.029 -0.003
3 Enrollees (0.060) (0.101) (0.118) (0.129) (0.041) (0.035)
DID for Round 0.086 0.134 0.005 -0.004 0.026 -0.035∗∗
3 & 4 Enrollees (0.060) (0.085) (0.111) (0.125) (0.039) (0.017)
Age 0.107∗∗ 0.168∗∗ -0.007 0.232∗∗ -0.013 -0.007
(0.047) (0.070) (0.087) (0.103) (0.033) (0.015)
Rural -0.039 -0.066 -0.051 -0.150 -0.007 0.008
(0.068) (0.095) (0.146) (0.160) (0.044) (0.018)
Schooling 0.002 0.014 0.012 0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.021) (0.037) (0.035) (0.045) (0.018) (0.019)
Household Income 0.006 0.007 -0.016∗ 0.011 0.006 -0.002
Per Capita (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002)
# of Co-residing 0.002 0.023∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.002 -0.000
People (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.002)
Daily Consumption 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.000
of Staple Food (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001)
# of Serious Illness -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.004 0.001∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.001)
BMI Index 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -1.379 -6.672 4.957 -2.761 -0.159 0.300
(2.804) (4.239) (5.359) (6.147) (1.968) (0.852)
Observations 4670 4609 4071 4680 4479 4415
R2 0.463 0.463 0.573 0.427 0.402 0.297
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; income and net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Test of the parallel trends before the policy: no controls
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
Placebo DID 1.163∗ -0.195 -0.235 -0.006 -0.043 -0.041
(0.639) (1.318) (0.908) (0.050) (0.058) (0.061)
Pseudo-indicator 0.446 4.854∗∗∗ -4.827∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ -0.034 -0.030
(0.375) (0.785) (0.492) (0.028) (0.031) (0.035)
Constant 72.664∗∗∗ 130.349∗∗∗ 82.913∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 3.643∗∗∗ 3.716∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.317) (0.208) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 2741 2739 2731 2706 2723 2759
R2 0.007 0.040 0.094 0.004 0.003 0.002
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
Placebo DID -0.074 -0.066 -0.059 -0.016 -0.063∗∗ -0.005
(0.046) (0.065) (0.087) (0.098) (0.025) (0.006)
Pseudo-indicator -0.075∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.020 -0.136∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.025) (0.038) (0.047) (0.053) (0.017) (0.005)
Constant 3.314∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗ 2.662∗∗∗ 3.812∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.006) (0.002)
Observations 2760 2724 2563 2760 2660 2671
R2 0.018 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Test of the parallel trends before the policy: full controls
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
Placebo DID 1.173 0.663 0.155 0.016 -0.030 -0.034
(0.717) (1.483) (1.008) (0.053) (0.062) (0.068)
Pseudo-indicator -0.196 -0.737 -13.110∗∗∗ 0.208 -0.172 0.213
(2.388) (5.212) (3.241) (0.170) (0.198) (0.220)
Constant 70.835 110.035 -60.622 -1.019 2.638 11.680∗
(74.949) (156.579) (98.276) (5.013) (5.819) (6.529)
Observations 2493 2490 2482 2463 2480 2509
R2 0.035 0.072 0.140 0.104 0.043 0.031
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
Placebo DID -0.100∗ -0.106 -0.045 0.029 -0.056∗ -0.004
(0.052) (0.072) (0.090) (0.105) (0.029) (0.008)
Pseudo-indicator -0.043 -0.122 0.203 -0.155 0.009 0.017
(0.164) (0.235) (0.289) (0.337) (0.091) (0.028)
Constant -2.557 -3.144 8.573 -14.855 -0.477 1.003
(4.625) (6.875) (8.611) (10.449) (2.539) (0.643)
Observations 2510 2481 2356 2510 2430 2437
R2 0.066 0.044 0.089 0.066 0.027 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Test of the validity of the control group
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
Counterfactual DID 0.437 1.230 2.560∗∗ 0.015 -0.066 -0.029
(0.813) (1.447) (1.073) (0.055) (0.072) (0.074)
Round 2 1.464 5.990∗ -9.918∗∗∗ 0.140 -0.330∗∗ -0.112
(1.913) (3.124) (2.453) (0.136) (0.165) (0.157)
Round 3 3.085 -20.448∗∗∗ 14.491∗∗∗ 0.321 -0.571∗ -0.180
(3.678) (5.995) (4.716) (0.264) (0.320) (0.302)
Round 4 4.255 -17.295∗∗ 11.350 0.368 -0.788∗ -0.285
(5.409) (8.718) (6.910) (0.387) (0.466) (0.440)
Constant 95.732∗ 134.893∗ 1.347 -0.224 -1.402 2.432
(49.449) (80.356) (63.991) (3.560) (4.212) (4.176)
Observations 4648 4650 4638 4562 4607 4677
R2 0.361 0.621 0.729 0.539 0.442 0.478
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
Counterfactual DID -0.029 -0.086 0.038 -0.031 0.034 0.012
(0.051) (0.079) (0.100) (0.104) (0.042) (0.013)
Round 2 -0.150 -0.478∗∗∗ 0.084 -0.141 0.022 0.007
(0.107) (0.164) (0.213) (0.234) (0.076) (0.029)
Round 3 -0.179 -0.952∗∗∗ 0.211 0.061 0.085 0.020
(0.204) (0.314) (0.416) (0.451) (0.143) (0.052)
Round 4 -0.328 -1.313∗∗∗ 0.240 -0.046 0.103 0.037
(0.296) (0.455) (0.600) (0.661) (0.206) (0.077)
Constant -1.148 -6.467 5.008 -2.739 -0.024 0.346
(2.779) (4.226) (5.445) (6.139) (1.975) (0.840)
Observations 4670 4609 4071 4680 4479 4415
R2 0.462 0.463 0.571 0.427 0.402 0.296
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 12: A glance at the post-policy dynamics of the elderly’s outcomes
Preference
Systolic Diastolic for Indepen- Life Sleep
Heart Rate Pressure Pressure dent Living Quality Quality
DID for Round 3 0.412 -1.796 -1.996∗ -0.016 0.207∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.808) (1.394) (1.190) (0.059) (0.075) (0.077)
DID for Round 4 -0.225 -3.758∗∗ -2.882∗∗ 0.005 0.108 0.065
(0.871) (1.457) (1.294) (0.063) (0.073) (0.082)
Round 2 1.479 6.301∗∗ -9.646∗∗∗ 0.140 -0.340∗∗ -0.118
(1.926) (3.115) (2.450) (0.136) (0.165) (0.157)
Round 3 3.081 -19.040∗∗∗ 16.180∗∗∗ 0.329 -0.670∗∗ -0.225
(3.757) (5.961) (4.710) (0.264) (0.321) (0.301)
Round 4 4.466 -14.999∗ 13.565∗∗ 0.369 -0.864∗ -0.328
(5.533) (8.694) (6.881) (0.387) (0.468) (0.439)
Constant 96.047∗ 144.507∗ 8.501 -0.239 -1.683 2.258
(49.802) (80.178) (63.816) (3.559) (4.217) (4.172)
Observations 4648 4650 4638 4562 4607 4677
R2 0.361 0.622 0.729 0.539 0.444 0.479
Health Health Deciding Net Trans- Net Transfers
(Interviewer (Self Family Deciding fers from from Grand-
Rated) Rated) Spending for Self Children children
DID for Round 3 0.108∗∗ 0.159∗ -0.065 0.011 0.014 -0.022∗∗
(0.054) (0.082) (0.102) (0.112) (0.034) (0.010)
DID for Round 4 0.073 0.040 -0.037 -0.060 0.052 -0.008
(0.054) (0.082) (0.104) (0.118) (0.043) (0.038)
Round 2 -0.157 -0.483∗∗∗ 0.090 -0.137 0.019 0.008
(0.108) (0.164) (0.213) (0.233) (0.076) (0.029)
Round 3 -0.232 -1.030∗∗∗ 0.250 0.057 0.083 0.032
(0.205) (0.313) (0.414) (0.449) (0.146) (0.052)
Round 4 -0.375 -1.359∗∗∗ 0.277 -0.024 0.088 0.045
(0.299) (0.457) (0.597) (0.661) (0.206) (0.076)
Constant -1.348 -6.569 5.156 -2.578 -0.163 0.363
(2.800) (4.245) (5.453) (6.137) (1.960) (0.862)
Observations 4670 4609 4071 4680 4479 4415
R2 0.463 0.463 0.571 0.427 0.402 0.296
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level; net transfers are in ten-thousand Yuan.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Number of observations by sex and age in each year
Age (in years) (0,3] (3,6] (6,12] (12,16] Total
Gender M F M F M F M F M F
2010 831 716 752 598 1,479 1,293 906 905 3,968 3,512
2012 897 816 831 774 1,490 1,290 914 839 4,132 3,719
2014 884 809 847 753 1,489 1,311 817 742 4,037 3,615
2016 803 742 762 733 1,348 1,120 643 549 3,556 3,144
Table 14: Number of observations by sex and lineage of co-residing grandparents in
each year
Co-residing with No GP Only Paternal Only Maternal Both Sides
Gender M F M F M F M F
2010 1,550 1,356 1,133 1,009 124 112 7 9
2012 1,490 1,279 1,689 1,545 141 146 6 7
2014 1,368 1,200 1,556 1,453 136 138 10 17
2016 1,044 928 1,219 1,062 130 119 14 6
Table 15: Number of observations by the community type and lineage of co-residing
grandparents in each year
Co-residing with No GP Only Paternal Only Maternal Both Sides
Community Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
2010 1,639 1,267 1,389 753 111 125 14 2
2012 1,554 1,169 2,192 1,029 148 138 11 2
2014 1,361 1,174 1,855 1,064 120 148 13 13
2016 965 979 1,391 877 94 154 7 13
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Table 16: Summary statistics of the outcome variables
gender variable N mean sd min 25th median 75th max
male weight (kg) 15,185 25.924 14.705 1.90 15.00 22.50 35.00 111.50
height (cm) 14,823 116.909 32.862 30.00 90.00 120.00 143.00 215.00
weight-for-age 10,152 -.104 1.597 -5.90 -1.02 -.06 .90 5.00
height-for-age 13,524 -.679 2.032 -6.00 -1.90 -.43 .68 6.00
female weight (kg) 13,487 24.683 13.538 2.25 14.50 21.00 35.00 94.50
height (cm) 13,179 115.934 32.113 21.00 90.00 120.00 145.00 180.00
weight-for-age 9,016 -.225 1.475 -5.96 -1.04 -.18 .69 4.95
height-for-age 12,156 -.733 1.952 -6.00 -1.81 -.49 .51 5.96
gender variable N mean sd min 25th median 75th max
male expenditures 1 15,189 0.175 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.200 7.490
health status 2 15,378 5.577 1.114 1 5 6 6 7
excellence 3 5,099 3.085 0.867 1 3 3 4 5
capability 4 5,086 2.811 1.150 1 2 3 4 5
female expenditures 1 13,516 0.186 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.205 16.000
health status 2 13,725 5.580 1.111 1 5 6 6 7
excellence 3 4,625 3.219 0.833 1 3 3 4 5
capability 4 4,598 3.043 1.116 1 2 3 4 5
[1] total educational expenditures are in ten-thousand Yuan.
[2] health status: an integer measure scaled from 1 to 7.
[3] self-rated excellence as a student: an integer measure scaled from 1 to 5.
[4] self-rated capability as a student cadre: an integer measure scaled from 1 to 5.
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Table 17: Determining factors identified in the literature of Chinese intergenerational
coresidence
Author Factor Affecting children Controllable
Chen (2005) childcare needs; widowhood;
health status
yes partially
Meng and Luo (2008) (urban China) housing avail-
ability
no yes
Zimmer and Korinek (2010) physical and material needs,
and marital status of the el-
derly
no partially
Sereny (2011) age, ethnicity, socioeco-
nomic status and family
care resources (on elders’
preference)
no partially
Rosenzweig and Zhang (2014) (urban China) parents’ and
grandparents’ income
yes yes
Zhang et al. (2014) filial piety; past receipt of
support; needs of the el-
derly; home ownership
yes partially




Yu and Yan (2016) marital status and income
(on reality); education (on
preference)
yes yes
Meng et al. (2017) (urban China) age (on pref-
erence); marital status
no yes
Fan et al. (2018) the relative income of the
elderly and their children;
health status
yes partially
Li and Wu (2018a) (urban China) the city-level
housing price
no yes
Yi et al. (2018) house price no yes
Wang et al. (2019) social norms, self-interest
and altruism
potentially partially
Note[1]: “on preference" stands for “having impacts on living preference".
Note[2]: “on reality" stands for “having impacts on actual arrangement".
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Table 18: Determining factors identified in the literature of world intergenerational
coresidence







Kamo and Zhou (1994) cultural values no yes
Ermisch and Di Salvo
(1997); Ermisch (1999);
Paciorek (2015)
housing cost no yes




Choi (1999) income; health status yes partially








Lee and Painter (2013); En-
gelhardt et al. (2016)
employment status no yes
Bolina and Tavares (2016) gender; income yes yes
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Table 19: Factors correlated with the coresidence decision
GP 1 GP 2 paternal 1 paternal 2 maternal 1 maternal 2
girl 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
child’s age -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.000∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
child’s health -0.030∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
mom -0.147∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.011) (0.013)
mom’s age -0.026∗∗ -0.029∗∗ -0.021 -0.022∗ -0.003 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006)
mom’s siblings -0.008 -0.008 0.005 0.005 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
dad’s siblings -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
mom’s education -0.009 -0.012 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
dad’s education 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
paternal GPs’ 0.002∗ 0.003∗ 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
max age (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
maternal GPs’ -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
max age (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
urban -0.054∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ 0.009 0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.008) (0.008)
mom’s income 0.010∗∗ 0.005 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
dad’s income -0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 14896 14570 14885 14559 14892 14566
R2 0.152 0.150 0.141 0.139 0.022 0.026
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level; income is in ten-thousand Yuan.
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